This paper considers the financing of investment in the presence of information asymmetry between "insiders" and "outsiders" of the firms. It establishes a well-defined capital structure for the economy as a whole with the following features: low-productivity firms rely on the equity market to finance investment at a relatively low level; mediumproductivity firms may not invest at all; and high-productivity firms rely on the debt market to finance investment at a relatively high level. It is shown that the debt market is efficient, with respect to the scope and the amount of investment made by each firm. However, the equity market fails: its scope is too narrow and the amount of investment each firm makes is too little. A unique but rather unconventional policy tool is proposed to achieve constrained Pareto-efficiency, i.e., subsidies to those firms that choose to equity-finance their investment (i.e., equity-marketcontingent grants).
Introduction
In a perfect capital market, all forms of capital financing are indistinguishable and there is no unique debt-equity structure within a firm or in the economy as a whole. In the presence of information asymmetry between a firm's "insiders" and "outsiders", however, a well-defined debt-equity capital structure for the whole economy can be determined. Under asymmetric information, the equity market may be plagued by a "lemons" problem while the debt market by possibilities of default. In such a context, we can endogenously determine the co-existence of three groups of firms: firms which equity-finance new investment, firms which debt-finance new investment, and firms which may not make any new investment at all.
In this paper, we analyze the investment behavior of firms in the presence of asymmetric information in capital markets. Firms may choose either to invest or not to make any investment at all and instead to produce with whatever stock of capital they possess. If they invest, they would need outside financing which may take the form of debt or equity. Firms are assumed to differ in productivity and productivity differences can be observed by ownermanagers but not by their debt-and equity-holders. It turns out that, in equilibrium, three types of behavior occur. Firms with low productivity will finance their investment via equity while the high-productivity firms will choose debt-financing. There may also be a group of firms with medium productivity that will not invest at all.
Under this equilibrium economy-wide capital structure, two kinds of efficiency issues arise. One can ask (1) if the firm's decision of whether to make new investment or not to invest at all is efficient; and (2) if those firms that choose to make new investment will invest inadequately or excessively. In order to address these issues, we develop a concept of constrained Paretoefficiency that takes into account the limitations imposed on the manager in carrying out the investment plans of the firm in the asymmetric information environment.We then identify the sources of inefficiencies that arise and discuss the appropriate corrective policies which turn out to be somewhat unconventional.
There is a well-known pecking order in corporate finance (see, e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984) . In financing new investment projects, the manager, who is better informed than the suppliers of funds, would prefer to rely on retained earnings. If these funds are insufficient, debt is preferred to equity since the choice of equity finance sends the potential signal that the manager thinks the firm's shares are overvalued. Our analysis of debt and equity finance builds on the corporate finance literature.The latter is based on partial equilibrium analysis of a single firm's investment and financing decisions focusing on issues of corporate governance. We take the corporate governance structures as exogenously given and focus on the macroeconomic issues. Both the demand for funds (i.e., the investment and financing decisions of the firms) and the supply of funds (i.e., the saving decisions of the consumers) are considered in a general equilibrium framework. In particular, we are interested in the efficiency implications of the various means of finance.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the analytical framework-classifying firms into three categories (i.e., those with equity-financed investment, debt-financed investment, and no new investment), deriving the firm's optimal investment rule, and laying out the equilibrium conditions in the economy. Section 3 introduces a concept of constrained efficiency for evaluation of the market equilibrium. Section 4 compares the market conditions with the efficiency conditions, explains the nature of market failure in this context, and proposes an optimal corrective policy. Concluding remarks are provided in section 5.
Analytical Framework
Suppose there is a very large number (N) of ex ante identical domestic firms. Each firm employs capital input (K) in the first period in order to produce a single composite good in the second period. We assume that capital depreciates at the rate d (< 1). Output in the second period is equal to F (K) (1 + e), where F (.) is a production function exhibiting diminishing marginal productivity of capital and e is a random productivity factor.The latter has zero mean and is independent across all firms. (e is bounded between -1 and 1, so that output is always non-negative.) We assume that e is purely idiosyncratic, so that there is no aggregate uncertainty 1 . Consumer-investors will thus behave in a risk-neutral way.
In the first period, firms determine their investment rules in the planning stage while the actual investment and its funding are delayed until the implementation stage. These investment rules are approved by the owners of the firms before realization of their productivity shocks. The management then implements these rules by seeking funds to finance the investment after e is known. For simplicity, we assume that the original owners of the investment sites do not have any retained earnings to finance their capital outlays, and will have to appeal to the equity or debt market instead. At the implementation and financing stage, the managers of the firms are better informed than the outside fund-suppliers. There are many ways to specify the degree of this asymmetry in information. However, in order to facilitate the analysis, we simply assume that the managers, being "close to the action", ob-serve e before they implement the investment rules and make their financing decisions; but the fund-providers, being "far away from the action", do not 2 .
A possible rationale behind this sequence of firm decisions whereby the investment choice is made ex ante while the financing of the pre-committed investment is decided ex post has to do with a potential agency problem between the board of directors (representing the owners) and the managers (who are responsible for making these decisions). Loosely speaking, the latter are not exclusively interested in the net worth of the firm as are the former. In the absence of full information about the firm's productivity, the owners will have to set investment guidelines for the managers (who know more about e than they do) so as to protect their own interests. This agency problem is not modelled explicitly here because we want to focus instead on the asymmetric information between the firm's "insiders" and "outsiders".What we do, however, capture in our model is the spirit of these investment guidelines in terms of the sequencing of information and the firm's investment and financing decisions.
The investment rules are, however, quite rigid in the degrees of freedom they allow the management. Depending on the realized value of the productivity factor (e), it may be strikingly more advantageous to debt-finance or equity-finance new investment or not to invest at all. For instance, a higherthan-average value of e which is observed by the manager but not by the fund-suppliers will be insufficiently priced by the equity market. In such a case, it will not be optimal for the manager to resort to the equity market. Similarly, a low realization of e observed by the manager but not by potential creditors will make it unprofitable for the manager to issue debt even though she is able to do so (as the creditors do not observe e) because of the detrimental effects of default. In the case of default, the original owner loses part or all of the existing capital as the residual value of the firm is seized by the debt-holders; whereas if the firm takes no loans and makes no new investment, she can retain all of the existing capital.
364 Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka and Chi-Wa Yuen 2 The information about e here is asymmetric between the firms (investors) on the one hand and the suppliers of funds (savers) on the other, in contrast to the asymmetric information structure between two groups of fund-suppliers (domestic vs. foreign savers) as developed by Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) and extended by Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) . The latter type of information asymmetry gives rise to home-biased portfolio investment as documented by Tesar and Werner (1995) . Many of the structural features of the Gordon-Bovenberg model are retained in this paper.
Specifically, the investment rule dictates the manager to take either one of three possible courses of actions once e is made known to her 3 :
(i) equity-finance new capital investment, so as to augment the stock of capital of the firm to a pre-determined level of K -; (ii) debt-finance new capital investment, so as to augment the stock of capital of the firm to a pre-determined level of K + ; and (iii) not to invest at all.
Since all firms face the same probability distribution of e when designing their investment rules, they all choose the same rule (i.e., the same K -and K + ).
Which Firms Will Equity-finance Investment?
As mentioned above, the managers observe e while the new potential shareholders of the firm do not. The market will be trapped in the "lemons" situation à la Akerlof (1970) . At the price offered by the new (uninformed) potential equity buyers, which reflects the average productivity of all firms (i.e., the average level of e) in the market, the manager of a firm experiencing a higher-than-average value of e would prefer to employ just the existing capital (i.e., K 0 ) rather than to raise equity from a market that will not pay a premium for a high value of e. Thus, there exists a cutoff level of e, denoted by e 0 , such that all firms which experience a value of e above e 0 will not make any new investment while all other firms (i.e., the low-e firms) will equityfinance their new investment at a price reflecting the average value of the "lemons". Define e -(e 0 ) as the mean value of e realized by the low-productivity firms:
( 1) where F (.) is the cumulative probability distribution of e. That is, e -(e 0 ) is the conditional expectation of e, given that e ≤ e 0 .
The cutoff level of e is then defined by
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Debt-and Equity-Financed Investment where K -is the stock of capital of the low-e firms that do make new investment, (1 -d)K 0 the undepreciated initial stock of capital for the firms that do not make any new investment, and r the risk-free rate of interest. For simplicity, we assume a small open economy so that the domestic rate of interest is determined exogenously by the world rate (r).The left-hand side of equation (2) represents the market value of the firm net of the new capital investment. Note that, to the potential new shareholders, all firms on the market are indistinguishable so that their productivity is evaluated at e -(e 0 ), i.e., the average productivity of the group of firms that choose to equity-finance their new investment. The right-hand side of (2) represents the value of the marginal firm to the manager who observes e and acts on behalf of the original firm owner. By the marginal firm, we mean the firm with the lowest productivity factor (e 0 ) among the group of firms that do not make equityfinanced new investment.
Recall that firms need external funds, which amount to
We assume that equity-financing takes the following form.The entire firm is sold in the equity market, and the new owners inject the additional funds needed to finance the new investment (i.e., K --(1-d)K 0 ). These are the guidelines issued by the original shareholders to the managers 4 .
Which Firms Will Debt-finance Investment?
Besides equity finance, an alternative source of finance is to have domestic firms borrow from banks or float bonds 5 . As in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , we allow for the possibility of default 6 . However, since the manager observes 366 Assaf Razin, Another possibility is that the original owner sells only a fraction of the firm's equity, a fraction that will suffice to finance the new investment. Evidently, this fraction will be state-dependent, i.e., once e is realized, the manager decides what fraction of the equity to issue.This productivity-dependent fraction will, however, provide a perfect signal about e that will unravel the asymmetric information problem. We are then back to a full-information environment with its well-known efficiency properties. Nevertheless, a completely state-dependent investment guideline may empower the manager with excessive discretion in the eyes of the shareholders. The full-information outcome cannot arise, however, if equity-buyers can use the revelation principle to extract information about the quality of the firm by offering to buy its equity at prices that are quoted as a function of the fraction of the firm's equity offered in the market. It is beyond the scope of the present paper to develop a more complicated model so as to pursue this issue of incentive-compatible, separating contracts. Instead, we stick to the simpler assumption that, under equity-financing, the entire firm is sold. 5 A related issue of sovereign debt in the context of asymmetric information is discussed in Eaton and Gersovitz (1989) . 6 For simplicity, we abstract from agency costs associated with debt-financing.Among other things, we assume that managers cannot affect the riskiness of investment and, hence, the probability of default.
the realized value of e before proceeding with the actual implementation of the pre-determined level of investment (denoted by K + -(1 -d)K 0 ) and the borrowing needed for its finance, it will never pay her to borrow if she knows that the firm will not be able to repay its loans at the end (i.e., it does not pay to default).This is because in the latter case, all its post-investment assets (i.e., F (K + ) (1+ e) + (1-d)K + ) will be seized, leaving the firm pennyless; while if it decides not to borrow to finance new investment, then it will still be left with
. Therefore, there will be a cutoff level of e, denoted by e 0 , such that all firms that realize a value of e below e 0 will not make any new investment and all other firms will borrow K + -(1-d)K 0 in order to increase their capital stock to K + . This cutoff level of e is given by
The left-hand side of (3) represents the market value, net of the new investment, of the marginal firm that debt-finances new investment; while the right-hand side represents the alternative market value for that firm if it chooses not to invest. By the marginal firm, we mean here the firm with the lowest realized productivity value among the group of firms that make debtfinanced investment.
For later use, we denote the mean value of the productivity factor for the firms that debt-finance their investment by e + (e 0 ), i.e., 
Which Firms Do Not Make New Investment?
All the firms that realize a value of e above e 0 and below e 0 will neither equity-finance nor debt-finance such investment, i.e., they will not invest at all. This set of firms will not be empty if e 0 < e 0 . By comparing conditions (2) and (3), one can see that e 0 < e 0 is indeed a possibility. This is because then the right-hand side of (2) will fall short of the right-hand side of (3). It follows that the left-hand side of (2) will also fall short of the left-hand side of (3), which is certainly true when e 0 < e 0 as the left-hand side of (2) represents the mean market value of the low-productivity firms (firms with e < e 0 ) while the
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left-hand side of (3) represents the market value of the marginal high-productivity firm (the firm with e = e 0 ) 8 . For later use, we define by e 0 (e 0 , e 0 ) the mean value of e for the firms that make no new investment, i.e.,
The Capital Structure of the Economy
In this economy, the set of firms is divided into three groups:
1. There are NF(e 0 ) low-e firms (i.e., firms with realized values of e below e 0 ) which equity-finance their new investment that augments the capital stock of each one of them to K -. 2. There are N[F(e 0 ) -F(e 0 )] medium-e firms (i.e., firms with realized values of e between e 0 and e 0 ) that make no new investment and operate with the undepreciated initial stock of capital (1-d)K 0 . 3. There are N[1 -F(e 0 )] high-e firms (i.e., firms with realized values of e above e 0 ) which debt-finance new investment that augments the capital stock of each one of them to K + .
The Investment Rule
The initial owner-managers determine K -and K + in the first stage before the realization of e. They nonetheless take into account the second-stage implementation procedure that gives the managers the option of not investing at all once they observe e. The objective of the owner-managers is to maximize the expected market value of the firm, which is given by The first curly-bracketed term on the right-hand side of (6) represents the expected value of the firm conditional on its being equity-financed, which will occur with probability F (e 0 ). Similarly, the second curly-bracketed term represents the expected value of the firm conditional on its making no new investment, which will occur with probability F (e 0 ) -F (e 0 ). The third curlybracketed term represents the expected value of the firm conditional on its being debt-financed, which will occur with probability 1 -F (e 0 ).
Maximization of (6) with respect to K -and K + yields the marginal capital productivity conditions:
and (8) The expected marginal product of capital, under either equity finance or debt finance, must equal the cost of capital (r + d). Note that since the mean productivity factor for the high-e firms (i.e., e + (e 0 )) is higher than the mean productivity factor for the low-e firms (i.e., e -(e 0 )), K + is bigger than K -. In other words, the high-productivity firms invest more than the low-productivity firms while the medium-productivity firms do not invest at all. This is depicted in figure 1 as the market solution (in contrast to the efficient solution to be discussed in section 4 below). 
The Rest of the Model
We denote the utility function of the representative household by
where C t is her consumption in period t = 1, 2.The consumer chooses her first and second period consumption (along with the residual saving) by maximizing her utility subject to her lifetime budget constraint. This maximization delivers the standard intertemporal condition:
In this small open economy, domestic investment can be financed by both domestic savings and capital imports. The intertemporal resource constraint is given by:
It states that the present value of consumption and investment (i.e., the uses of funds) cannot exceed the present value of output and the undepreciated stocks of capital at the end of the production process (i.e., the sources of funds). Note also that, in period one, there is an amount of output NF(K 0 ) whose production began one period earlier. The capital inflows, denoted FI (for foreign investment) simply equal the excess of domestic investment over domestic saving, i.e.,
Constrained Efficiency
An intrinsic feature of this economy is that the investment rule cannot be fine-tuned to be completely state-contingent. The desired stocks of capital must be determined ex ante before e is revealed and, once it is revealed, the managers can only choose whether to carry out the pre-determined debtfinanced level of investment, or equity-financed level of investment, or not to invest at all.In other words,a refined and continuous state-dependent function K (e) for the desired stock of capital is ruled out. For a sensible evaluation of this market solution, we therefore look for a benchmark efficiency concept that respects this quasi-institutional constraint. 
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This constraint boils down to dividing the firms into at most three categories: low-productivity investing firms, medium-productivity non-investing firms, and high-productivity investing firms. We first ask whether the market distribution of the firms into these three categories is efficient. In particular, one may ask whether the middle category should vanish, so that all firms should invest. We then ask whether the investment levels for the firms in the two investing categories are efficient 9 . Specifically, we ask whether e 0 , e 0 , K -, and K + are efficient.
Formally, the efficient allocation is determined by choosing {C 1 , C 2 , e 0 , e 0 , K -, K + } to maximize the utility function of the representative household (9) subject to the economy-wide resource constraint (11). The first order conditions (see the Appendix) are given by:
Suppose e + (e 0 ) > e -(e 0 ), as will be the case if e 0 ≤ e 0 , then (7a) and (8a) will imply that K -is smaller than K + , i.e., the low-e firms will invest less than the high-e firms. (Note that the possibility of e 0 > e 0 is redundant because of the symmetry between (K -, e 0 ) and (K + , e 0 ) 10 .) We can show, however, that e 0 = e 0 is not possible.To see this, suppose to the contrary that e 0 = e 0 . It then follows from (2a) and (3a) that K -must equal K + , which contradicts (7a) and (7b), given e + (e 0 ) > e -(e 0 ) when e 0 = e 0 .
Market Failure and Corrective Policy
Is the market allocation constrained efficient the way we have defined it above? Recall that the market allocation is characterized by conditions (2), (3), (7), (8), and (10) and the constrained efficient allocation by (2a), (3a), (7a), (8a), and (10a). Of course, the two allocations satisfy also the intertemporal resource constraint (11).
371 Debt-and Equity-Financed Investment Observe that conditions (3a), (7a), (8a), and (10a) are identical to (3), (7), (8), and (10) respectively. The intertemporal market allocation of consumption follows the constrained efficiency rule. Somewhat strikingly, the debt market is efficient, both in its width (as indicated by e 0 ) and in the level of investment (K --(1 -d)K 0 ) carried out by each debt-financed firm.
The equity market fails, however, both in its width (as indicated by e 0 ) and the level of investment (K --(1-d)K 0 ) carried out by each equity-financed firm. We can show that the equity market is too narrow, and the capital investment it finances too low; see figure 1. Thus, the aggregate stock of capital under the market allocation is less than efficient. To prove this, suppose that the cutoff value of e in the equity market (e 0 ) is at the efficient level. Then (7) and (7a) imply that the capital investment (K -) is also efficient. Now, consider the marginal firm which realizes a value of e equal to e 0 . Its market value is given by the left-hand side of (2a) with e 0 replaced by e -(e 0 ). Since e -(e 0 ) < e 0 , its market value (computed in terms of the average productivity of the firms in the equity market) must fall short of its alternative no-investment value as known to this marginal firm, which actually observes that its e is equal to e 0 . This firm will thus drop out of the market, and the equity market will shrink in size. As a result, the equity market e 0 will fall short of the efficient e 0 . Furthermore, the equity market level of K -will be below the efficient level of K -because the equity market value of e -(e 0 ) is below the efficient value of e -(e 0 ) (cf. (7) and (7a)).The reason for this market failure lies in the fact that the marginal firm is unable to extract its true market value as known to her and has to settle for the average market value of all firms in the market. That is, the decision of the marginal firm whether to equity-finance its investment is dictated by the comparison between the average value of investment (based on the average e, which is e -(e 0 )) and the marginal value of not investing (based on e 0 ). On the other hand, the metaphorical planner, who determines the constrained efficient allocation, weighs the marginal value of equity-financed investment (at e 0 ) against the marginal value of no investment (also at e 0 ).
The prescription for corrective policy is straightforward. What is needed is simply to correct the equity market cutoff level of e (i.e., e 0 ).As can be seen from (7) and (7a), once e 0 and hence e -(e 0 ) are set at their efficient levels, the stock of capital (K -) will adjust to the efficient level as well. Comparing (2) and (2a), we can also see that the market e 0 will coincide with the efficient e 0 if a subsidy is granted to the equity-financed firms so as to equate for the marginal firm its market value (inclusive of the subsidy) to its true value as observed by its manager. That is, the subsidy (S) is set such that S + F (K -) [1 + e -(e 0 )] = F (K -) (1 + e 0 ), which yields Note that this subsidy must be a fixed sum. It must not depend on the amount invested, but would rather depend only on the firm's decision whether to invest through equity finance or not to invest (i.e., to be in the equity market or to drop out of it). In particular, it does not interfere with the marginal productivity condition (7a) of how much to invest 11 .This somewhat unconventional policy of a subsidy that is conditional on joining the equity market suffices to restore constrained efficiency for the entire economy.
Conclusion
This paper considers the financing of investment in the presence of asymmetric information between the "insiders" and the "outsiders" of the firms. It establishes a well-defined capital structure for the economy as a whole with the following features: low-productivity firms rely on the equity market to finance investment at a relatively low level; medium-productivity firms do not invest at all; and high-productivity firms rely on the debt market to finance investment at a relatively high level. It is shown that the debt market is efficient, with respect to both its scope and the amount of investment that each firm makes. However, the equity market fails: its scope is too narrow and the investment each firm makes is too little.A corrective policy requires just one policy instrument which is rather unconventional, i.e., subsidies to those firms that choose to equity-finance their investment (i.e., equity-market-contingent grants).
Our theoretical framework and the associated results suggest three empirical implications. The first and most obvious implication is that the profitability of firms will increase with the debt-equity ratio. Second, if there exist systematic changes in the distribution of high-and low-productivity firms during the business cycle, then the debt-equity structure in the economy will vary over the cycles in a systematic manner. In particular, if the distribution of firms tilts towards relatively high productivity firms because of their cleansing effect during recessions, then the debt-equity ratio will rise. Similarly, the debt-equity ratio will fall during economic booms because a group of new, low-productivity firms will enter. Third, during the process of capital market development, as rules of disclosure and prudential regulations get increasingly incorporated into the workings of these markets, one can conjecture that the "lemons" problem in the equity market will become less serious. As a result, the debt-equity ratio is likely to fall. A more rigorous examination of these hypotheses is left for future research.
Appendix
In this appendix, we derive the first order conditions for constrained efficiency (i.e., equations (2a), (3a), (7a), (8a), and (10a) in the text). For this purpose, we first express the derivatives of e -(e 0 ) from equation (1), e + (e 0 ) from equation (4), and e 0 (e 0 , e 0 ) from equation (5), with respect to their corresponding arguments as follows: The metaphorical planner's constrained efficiency problem is to maximize the utility of the representative household (9) subject to the economy-wide intertemporal resource constraint (11) by choice of {C 1 , C 2 , e 0 , e 0 , K -, K + }.The first order conditions for C 1 and C 2 yield (10a), while those for K -and K + yield (7a) and (8a) respectively, in the text. The first order conditions for e 0 and e 0 are given by the following two equations: Substituting (12)- (15) into (16) and (17) 
